Location: programme


Friday, 14 March 2014

9:00 - 9:10


9:10 - 10:25

Resource sharing

Simina Brânzei and Peter Bro Miltersen
Indirect revelation mechanisms for cake cutting

Oskar Skibski, Tomasz Michalak and Michael Wooldridge
Reconsidering the Shapley value in games with externalities

Piotr L. Szepański, Michael Wooldridge

A Centrality Measure for Networks With a Community Structure Based on the Owen Value
10:25 - 10:55

Coffee break

10:55 - 12:35

Coalitional games and markets

Péter Wojuteczky and Peter Biro
Stable fixtures problem with payments

Mikołaj Jasiński
Estimation of partial homogeneity structure in simple games

Tamás Solymosi
Manipulability of core prices in assignment markets

Zbigniew Świtalski
A characterization of the set of equilibrium price vectors in the Gale-Shapley market model

12:35 - 13:40


13:40 - 14:25

Invited talk:

Piotr Faliszewski
Axiomatic and Computational Issues in Multiwinner Elections

14:25 - 14:50

Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
Belief distorted Nash equilibria

14:50 - 15:20

Coffee break

15:20 - 17:00


Yuko Sakurai
Predicting Own Actions: Self-fulfilling Prophecy Induced by Proper Scoring Rules

Marek Szopa
Can quantum version of prisoner's dilemma help in negotiations?

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett and Lukasz Woźny
A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities

Łukasz Balbus, Paweł Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett and Lukasz Woźny
Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

Saturday, 15 March 2014

9:00 - 10:40

Mechanism design

Peter Egri and Jozsef Vancza
Information elicitation mechanism for the multiple newsvendor problem with costly forecasting

Endre Csóka
Efficient Teamwork

Qiang Zhang and Minming Li
Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line

Maksymilian Kwiek and Qi Zhang
Majority rule and mechanism design

10:40 - 11:10

Coffee break

11:10 - 12:25

Algorithmic game theory

Piotr Skowron, Krzysztof Rządca and Anwitaman Datta
People are processors: coalitional auctions for complex projects

Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo and Makoto Yokoo
A complexity approach for Pareto efficient exchange with multiple indivisible goods

Piotr Skowron and Piotr Faliszewski
Approximating the Maxcover problem with bounded frequencies in FPT time

12:25 - 13:30


13:30 - 14:15

Invited talk:

Edith Elkind
Preference Aggregation on Structured Domains

14:15 - 14:40

Marcin Malawski
Procedural and weighted values for TU games

14:40 - 15:10

Coffee break

15:10 - 15:45

Poster presentations

15:45 - 16:35


Svetlana Obraztsova, Evangelos Markakis and David Thompson
Plurality voting with truth-biased agents

Dominikus Krüger and Britta Dorn
Some more results on bribery in voting with CP-nets